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Successful evacuations are critical to saving lives from future tsunamis. Pedestrian-evacuation modeling
related to tsunami hazards primarily has focused on identifying areas and the number of people in these
areas where successful evacuations are unlikely. Less attention has been paid to identifying evacuation
pathways and population demand at assembly areas for at-risk individuals that may have sufﬁcient time
to evacuate. We use the neighboring coastal communities of Hoquiam, Aberdeen, and Cosmopolis
(Washington, USA) and the local tsunami threat posed by Cascadia subduction zone earthquakes as a
case study to explore the use of geospatial, least-cost-distance evacuation modeling for supporting
evacuation outreach, response, and relief planning. We demonstrate an approach that uses geospatial
evacuation modeling to (a) map the minimum pedestrian travel speeds to safety, the most efﬁcient paths,
and collective evacuation basins, (b) estimate the total number and demographic description of evacuees
at predetermined assembly areas, and (c) determine which paths may be compromised due to earth-
quake-induced ground failure. Results suggest a wide range in the magnitude and type of evacuees at
predetermined assembly areas and highlight parts of the communities with no readily accessible as-
sembly area. Earthquake-induced ground failures could obstruct access to some assembly areas, cause
evacuees to reroute to get to other assembly areas, and isolate some evacuees from relief personnel.
Evacuation-modeling methods and results discussed here have implications and application to tsunami-
evacuation outreach, training, response procedures, mitigation, and long-term land use planning to in-
crease community resilience.
Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In the aftermath of recent tsunami disasters (e.g., from the
2004 Indian Ocean earthquake to the 2015 Chilean Illapel earth-
quake), there has been an increase in efforts to better understand
and communicate the vulnerability of coastal communities to fu-
ture tsunamis. Much of the work has focused on life safety issues
for individuals located in tsunami-hazard zones, such as popula-
tion-exposure assessments [24], demographic-sensitivity analyses
[50], and pedestrian-evacuation modeling (e.g., [10,11,33]). The
focus of most evacuation-modeling studies has been on identifying
areas where at-risk individuals may have insufﬁcient time toaccess article under the CC BY-NC
jones@usgs.gov (J. Jones),evacuate before arrival of the ﬁrst tsunami wave, thereby sug-
gesting potential loss of life. In few cases, pedestrian evacuation
modeling has gone further to examine alternatives for minimizing
the potential loss of life, such as vertical-evacuation siting [29,51]
or urban design changes [19,20].
Pedestrian-evacuation modeling to estimate the magnitude of
at-risk individuals in areas of unlikely evacuations helps elected
and appointed ofﬁcials to better understand potential losses and
possible risk-reducing mitigation alternatives. There has been less
discussion, however, on evacuation pathways and response issues
for at-risk individuals in areas where successful evacuations are
more likely. For example, Wood et al. [52] estimate that 83% of the
approximately 95,000 residents in tsunami-hazard zones asso-
ciated with a local Cascadia subduction zone earthquake in the U.S.
Paciﬁc Northwest may have sufﬁcient time to reach high ground
before wave arrival. Efforts to build vertical-evacuation refuges for
at-risk individuals that may not have sufﬁcient time to evacuate
are appropriate and important (e.g., [8]); however, equally-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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residents that likely have sufﬁcient time but are not guaranteed a
successful evacuation if they fail to evacuate appropriately.
As pedestrian-evacuation modeling matures in the literature,
one area that warrants greater attention relates to likely pathways
for evacuees. An improved understanding of evacuation pathways
could help emergency managers, land use planners, and trafﬁc
management ofﬁcials to identify heavily used routes that then
could be prioritized for road improvements, such as evacuation
lighting and signage (e.g., [19,32]). Understanding likely evacua-
tion corridors could be used in education and training efforts to
help neighborhood leaders to build community cohesion on tsu-
nami preparedness, as well as the creation of support networks
during an evacuation, such as for individuals with limited mobility.
Understanding the magnitude of evacuees along speciﬁc pathways
also can help emergency managers understand population de-
mand and capacity issues at pre-determined assembly areas.
Having a sense of whether an assembly area could expect 100 or
1000 evacuees will help emergency managers develop realistic
response plans to assist survivors and to direct relief personnel.
This insight could guide post-tsunami reconnaissance efforts (e.g.,
[47]) by prioritizing corridors heavily used by a coastal commu-
nity. Priest et al. [36] discusses the modeling of evacuation path-
ways, but do not address population magnitudes along pathways
or potential population demand at assembly areas.
Another area for improvement in pedestrian-evacuation mod-
eling is in recognizing potential changes in the evacuation land-
scape due to the initial earthquake. Local earthquakes large en-
ough to generate tsunamis (typically Mw 7.0 and greater) will
produce relatively instant geomorphic changes to the landscape,
such as liquefaction, lateral spread, subsidence, and landslides
[38]. These earthquake-induced ground failures could block cer-
tain evacuation routes, either by surface debris or by signiﬁcant
cracks in the ground. These impediments can slow or restrict
evacuees from reaching higher ground, making them susceptible
to approaching tsunami waves. Roads closed to landslide debris
could also cut off survivors at an assembly area from emergency
responders and relief personnel. To date, we are not aware of any
pedestrian-evacuation modeling efforts that recognize or account
for earthquake-induced ground failures.
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate a new application
of geospatial, pedestrian-evacuation modeling that helps informFig. 1. Study area map of Aberdeen, Hoquiam, and Cosmopolis, Washington, including o
[43] and model outputs provided by the State of Washington Department of Natural Resoevacuation and relief planning for tsunami hazards. To demon-
strate this approach, we focus on the coastal communities of
Aberdeen, Hoquiam, and Cosmopolis (Fig. 1), located in south-
western Grays Harbor County in the State of Washington (USA).
Like other coastal communities in the U.S. Paciﬁc Northwest, these
neighboring communities are threatened by local tsunamis asso-
ciated with Cascadia subduction zone earthquakes. First, we use
geospatial, anisotropic, path distance models to map the most
efﬁcient paths for pedestrians from within a tsunami-hazard zone
to high ground. We then use this information to identify evacua-
tion basins, which outline neighborhoods that share common
evacuation pathways to safety. This information can help guide
individuals to safety in dense urban areas where optimal routes
may be difﬁcult to discern. Second, we estimate the number of
people traveling along certain evacuation pathways and arriving at
pre-determined assembly areas, which helps gauge shelter de-
mand and determine the need for additional relief support (e.g.,
for elderly individuals, children, or tourists). Third, we determine
which paths could be inaccessible due to earthquake-induced
ground failures or bridge failures, which may inﬂuence whether or
not individuals can reach safety. Finally, we discuss the implica-
tions and application of our analysis for tsunami-evacuation out-
reach, training, response planning, mitigation, and long-term land
use planning to increase community resilience.2. Study area
The neighboring cities of Aberdeen, Hoquiam, and Cosmopolis
in southwestern Grays Harbor County, Washington (Fig. 1), are
situated on the seismically active Paciﬁc Ocean basin and therefore
are threatened by distant tsunamis generated by earthquakes
elsewhere (e.g., 2011 Tohoku) and by those generated locally by
earthquakes within the Cascadia subduction zone (CSZ). Tsunami
waves associated with a CSZ-related earthquake are estimated to
arrive along the southwest Washington coast approximately
25 min after the initial earthquake [4,43]. Thirteen assembly areas
have been proposed for tsunami evacuation in these communities
and are identiﬁed on publicly available evacuation brochures [44].
Wood et al. [52] estimates there are approximately 20,600 re-
sidents in Aberdeen, Hoquiam, and Cosmopolis that are in CSZ-
related, tsunami-hazard zones, representing 75% of the totalfﬁcial assembly areas [44] and a tsunami-hazard zone associated with Walsh et al.
urces based on Priest et al. [35] (T. Walsh, written communication, August 20, 2014).
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modeling in this same study estimates that approximately 99% of
the at-risk residents in these three communities may be able to
reach high ground assuming they move at a speed regarded as a
fast walk (1.52 m/s). This area likely represents the highest con-
centration of tsunami survivors for the entire coastline directly
affected by CSZ-related waves and account for 22% of all residents
in CSZ-related tsunami hazard zones [52]. Successful evacuations
are not guaranteed in these communities, however, because in-
dividuals will need to take self-protective action (i.e., no ofﬁcial
evacuation organized by public ofﬁcials) and take the appropriate
paths to safety depending on where they are when the earthquake
occurs.
Because of the high number and percentage of residents that
may be able to reach high ground before ﬁrst wave arrival, these
three communities represent an ideal case study for examining the
distribution of survivors after the ﬁrst wave, as well as conditions
during an evacuation that may inhibit a successful evacuation. One
issue that may affect evacuations is earthquake-related ground
failures, such as landslides or liquefaction, along an evacuation
route. The three towns are on the banks of the Chehalis, Wishkah,
and Hoquiam rivers (Fig. 1) and the underlying unconsolidated
sediment of the river ﬂoodplain is susceptible to earthquake li-
quefaction [38], likely causing signiﬁcant damage to the road
network and preventing vehicular evacuation. Earthquake-in-
duced landslides on the bluffs surrounding the cities also have the
potential to cut off evacuation routes to high ground [38], in-
cluding those along certain roadways leading to predetermined
assembly areas [44].
Pedestrian-evacuation modeling summarized in Wood et al.
[52] suggests that some residents and visitors may need to cross
bridges, such as Highway 101 over the Chehalis River connecting
central and South Aberdeen (Fig. 1), in order to reach high ground
and the nearest designated assembly area in the least amount of
time. The study area contains several bridges and evacuees in
these areas may face a difﬁcult choice of relying on an evacuation
path over a potentially damaged bridge or taking a longer path
over land to safety. In other parts of these communities, residents
and visitors are located relatively close to high ground for suc-
cessful self-evacuations. In this paper, we examine the evacuation
pathways to estimate population counts at the assembly areas and
highlight potential evacuation challenges for emergency
managers.3. Methods
Our analysis focuses on identifying tsunami-evacuation path-
ways, basins of converging pathways, and potential obstacles to
effective evacuations within the cities of Aberdeen, Hoquiam, and
Cosmopolis, Washington. We also estimate the number and types
of people that may arrive at assembly areas previously identiﬁed
by local emergency managers. We discuss here the various input
data and geospatial analytical methods related to geospatial, pe-
destrian-evacuation modeling to characterize the evacuation
landscape and to estimate population demand at assembly areas.
3.1. Pedestrian evacuation modeling
Pedestrian travel times to safety are based on a least-cost-distance
(LCD) model implemented in ESRI's ArcMap 10.2 geographic in-
formation system (GIS) software that takes into account the slope
and land cover of an area to calculate the most efﬁcient (i.e., least
cost) paths on foot to safety from every location in a hazard zone
[16,48,49]. We do not evaluate vehicular evacuations due to the
probable earthquake damage to roads and the emphasis onpedestrian evacuations in regional tsunami outreach efforts [4]. The
tsunami-hazard zone used in this analysis reﬂects a combination of
two previously published tsunami-hazard zones. The ﬁrst hazard
zone is summarized in Walsh et al. [43] and is associated with a “1A
with asperity” deterministic scenario for an Mw 9.1 earthquake
within the Cascadia Subduction Zone (CSZ) that assumes 450 years of
slip accumulation. A more recent tsunami-hazard zone provided by
the State of Washington Department of Natural Resources is asso-
ciated with an Mw 9.0 CSZ earthquake with source parameters re-
ferred regionally as the “L1” scenario, which is a deterministic sce-
nario assuming 650–800 years of slip accumulation and a 95% con-
ﬁdence interval ([35]; T. Walsh, written communication, August 20,
2014). The decision to combine the two tsunami-hazard zones (Fig. 1)
was based on input from State, Tribal, and local emergency man-
agers, who wished to be conservative in their understanding of
where inundation was possible.
The speciﬁc LCD method used in this evacuation analysis is
based on an anisotropic, path distance approach in which surface
distances are calculated between cells of varying elevations and
are then multiplied by travel costs to estimate the amount of time
it takes to cross a cell. Travel costs are classiﬁed as speed con-
servation values (SCV), where each value represents the percent of
base travel speed for crossing that cell, given the local land cover
type and slope. The modeling then estimates travel directions
based on optimal routes of least costs (lowest amount of time in
our case), which can be used to estimate overall travel times along
an evacuation path for any maximum speed under ideal conditions
(i.e., slightly downhill, paved streets). Slope SCVs are based on
Tobler's hiking function [40], and slopes were derived from 1-m
resolution digital elevation model (DEM; [46]). Land cover SCVs
are based on Soule and Goldman's [39] energy cost terrain coef-
ﬁcients for certain land cover types [49], and land cover was de-
rived from a supervised and manual classiﬁcation of 1-m resolu-
tion, red-green-blue (RGB)-band orthorectiﬁed imagery taken
between 2009 and 2012 [42]. Maps of minimum travel times to
safety are generated by path distance outputs based on surface
distance, slope, and land cover SCVs and a maximum travel speed
under ideal conditions (e.g., [49]).
While previous efforts to model pedestrian evacuations from
tsunamis have focused on travel across all landcover types (e.g.,
[52]), we constrained travel in this case study to road networks.
This is because pedestrian evacuation routing, signage, and train-
ing within an urban area will likely focus on roads and sidewalks.
Although one could characterize a roads-only evacuation using an
agent-based network analysis that models movement of in-
dividuals (e.g., [17,34,53]), we continued our use of a LCD-based
modeling approach to allow for future work that could allow for
travel across certain land cover types (e.g., public ﬁelds, parking
lots) but barring it from crossing private property. It is unlikely
that people will only stay on roads if presented with a more direct
and obviously shorter path across a parking lot or maintained ﬁeld
but it is also unlikely that people will know of or have access to
every short path through private property. Therefore, we feel our
use of the LCD modeling environment with the ability to constrain
various aspects of the evacuation landscape provides the greatest
ﬂexibility to emergency managers in future applications. In addi-
tion, an LCD-based approach provides evacuation insight on all
areas of a hazard zone across a community, whereas an agent-
based approach only models where populations are located for a
speciﬁc scenario. The spatially explicit representation of evacua-
tion times provided by LCD modeling offers emergency managers
the ability understand the entire evacuation landscape in their
community and not simply clearance times for a speciﬁc scenario
of population distribution.
One complication of a roads-only, evacuation-modeling ap-
proach is that population locations (e.g., households, businesses)
0 20 meters
Artificial driveways
Road
Structure
Road
Structure
Fig. 2. Comparison of (a) original road network and (b) added segments (“artiﬁcial driveways”) to connect residential and business population counts to road networks.
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patially connected to roads for the model to incorporate popula-
tion counts. To connect business and residential locations with
road-centerline data from the State of Washington [45], we used
the ArcMap Near tool [9] to return the nearest point on a road line
for each population point and then constructed line segments
using a custom Python script based on the original point and the
new point on the road. This approach effectively creates a drive-
way or business entrance for each original population point. The
new line segments are then buffered by 2 m to give the segment
width and then merged with the similarly buffered roads layer
(Fig. 2). The original population point is then located at the end of
each of the newly generated line segments. The ﬁnal roads layer is
used to create the cost surface with a travel cost of 1.0 assigned to
the entire surface (i.e., no energy reduction due to land cover), and
LCD modeling is performed using this landcover SCV surface in
combination with the 1-m slope SCV grid. Multiple time mapsFig. 3. Model diagram of the geospatial processing to gthen are generated at different travel speeds to determine the
speed necessary for successful evacuation of all residents and
businesses before ﬁrst wave arrival.
Maps visualizing the minimum travel speeds necessary to
reach safety before ﬁrst wave arrival have been created based
solely on surface distances [36]. To better account for land cover
and slope inﬂuences on an evacuation, we generated minimum
travel speed maps by combining maps of travel times based on
various maximum speeds for the study area (Fig. 3). This is done
because the mathematical underpinning of the anisotropic, path
distance modeling is based on the user establishing a maximum
speed for the study area and individual grid cells having reduced
speeds due to local landcover and slope conditions. Travel-time
maps based on various maximum travel speeds can be then
compared to determine the minimum speed necessary to reach
safety from a given grid cell. We ran path distance models for
several maximum travel speeds, including 0.89 m/s for impairedenerate travel speed maps and evacuation basins.
Backlink raster
Output raster from 
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Fig. 4. Comparison of numbering conventions for backlink rasters and Flow Di-
rection modeling outputs.
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walking speed, 1.79 m/s for a slow running speed, and 3.85 m/s for
a fast running speed [16]. Each of the resulting travel time maps
were then reclassiﬁed based on the amount of time available for
an evacuation. For example, if we assume evacuees have 25 min
before wave arrival, we identiﬁed areas in each of the travel-time
maps where times were less than 25 min. Values for those cells in
these areas were reclassiﬁed to denote the travel speed and the
remaining portions of the hazard zone were reclassiﬁed with va-
lues of 999. The ﬁve reclassiﬁed maps were then mosaicked to-
gether and combined where cells reﬂected the minimum value of
the ﬁve maps. The ﬁnal map summarizes the minimum travel
speed (binned based on the ﬁve maximum speeds noted above)
for each cell along an optimal evacuation path to safety. For this
case study, we generated three different minimum travel speeds
based on different assumptions for evacuation time, including
(a) 25 min, which is assumed to be wave arrival after the begin-
ning of the initiating CSZ earthquake [4,43], (b) 20 min, which
subtracts 5 min due to the expected duration of the CSZ earth-
quake (i.e., people are unlikely to evacuate while the ground is
shaking), and (c) 15 min, which subtracts an additional ﬁve min-
utes to account for evacuation delays due to human behavior.
Population locations were estimated using various data sources.
Business locations for our study area came from a 2012 Employer
Database [12], which includes information on the number of onsite
employees and business type based on the North American In-
dustrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) code (U.S. Census Bureau
[41]). NAICS codes were used to identify community support busi-
nesses (e.g., banks, government ofﬁces, grocery stores, and religious
organizations), dependent-care facilities (e.g., child and elderly
services, schools, and medical facilities), and public venues (e.g.,
accommodations and outdoor venues). We focus on the number of
businesses and ofﬁces in tsunami-hazard zones and not the number
of individuals at each site, given that the number of customers at
commercial stores and ofﬁces, visitors at public venues, and people
at schools and medical facilities varies greatly throughout the day,
week, and year. However, one could work with emergency man-
agers to assume a certain range of individuals for a given set of
businesses or ofﬁces for a speciﬁc planning and exercise scenario.
The high number of combinations of daytime vs. nighttime, week-
day vs. weekend, and time of year scenarios precludes our ability to
choose one over other possibilities. For this reason, we focus only on
the number of businesses in hazard zones.
Residential sites were manually derived from the previously
described imagery. Residential-population counts and related de-
mographic attributes at each residence were determined by dis-
aggregating block-level 2010 Census data [41] to the residential
locations falling within their boundaries. In addition to general
population counts, we also calculated the number of residents that
are less than 5 years in age and greater than 65 years in age, which
are two demographic groups considered to be more vulnerable
than other age groups to sudden-onset hazards because of po-
tential mobility and health issues [3,25,26,28]. Individuals less
than 5 years in age are considered to have heightened vulner-
ability because they often require direction and assistance to
evacuate due to their immaturity, size, and potential inability to
comprehend what self-protective actions to take [3]. Individuals
older than 65 years are considered also to have heightened vul-
nerability due to potential mobility and health issues, reluctance to
evacuate, and the need for special medical equipment at shelters
[25]. This discussion of demographic sensitivities is not based on
extensive studies of residents in our study area, but instead on past
social-science research of many types of extreme events (e.g.,
earthquakes, tornadoes, and hurricanes). Therefore, the extent of
these demographic sensitivities for a speciﬁc individual in our
study area is inﬂuenced by his or her physical condition, socialcontext, level of preparedness before a tsunami, and adaptive ca-
pacity during an event.3.2. Evacuation pathways and basins
Determining evacuation pathways is analogous to some degree
with modeling water ﬂow on a surface. In geospatial hydrological
modeling, the direction that water would ﬂow across the land-
scape is modeled by using a DEM to determine the direction of the
steepest slope from a cell to each one of its eight nearest neighbors
[15]. Knowing which direction water ﬂows across each pixel in a
study area allows analysts to identify both the drainage areas that
contribute ﬂow to any given location, as well as in which locations
ﬂow is concentrated enough to form stream channels.
In addition to pedestrian evacuation time surfaces, path-dis-
tance analyses also generate backlink rasters, which show the di-
rection evacuees would travel from each cell towards safe zones.
The backlink raster can be used as a substitute for the ﬂow di-
rection raster with hydrology modeling approaches to identify
both evacuation basins, as well as “channels” or pathways that are
expected to have higher concentrations of evacuees (Fig. 3). Before
backlink rasters can be used to identify pathways, they must be
transformed because they are encoded in different ways than
ArcMap Flow Direction outputs (Fig. 4). Direction values in back-
link rasters are encoded from 1 to 8 starting with a value of one
indicating movement to the right, with increasing numbers in-
dicating movement in towards the next direction clockwise from
there. Flow direction rasters are similarly encoded, but start with a
value of one to the right and doubling every cell in a clockwise
direction (i.e., 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, and 128). Once backlink rasters
values are transformed to match Flow Direction values, then they
can be used as input for subsequent pathway analyses, including
the creation of evacuation networks and basins.
The reclassiﬁed backlink rasters were used along with population
data as an input to the ArcMap Flow Accumulation tool to produce a
weighted, evacuation ﬂow accumulation raster (Fig. 3). This raster
layer records the total evacuees expected to pass through each cell in
the study area on their way to safety. This layer also allows for a
visual identiﬁcation of common stream-like “channels” through
which a high number of evacuees would move. Evacuation pour
points were identiﬁed where these channels crossed into the safe
zones, and then entered in conjunctionwith the reclassiﬁed backlink
raster into the watershed tool to identify the area from which the
evacuees reaching that point came. These evacuation watersheds or
“evacuation-sheds” identify neighborhood ﬂow paths for evacuation
and can be used to estimate the number and types of residents and
businesses moving along similar routes, and when overlaid on the
travel time maps, provide information on the travel time it would
take to empty each evacuation basin.
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Thirteen assembly areas have been identiﬁed for our study area
(Fig. 1) and it would aid the emergency managers and ﬁrst re-
sponders to have some idea of the volume of people likely to reach
each area and the population breakdown by such factors as age or
other demographic characteristics. To estimate population mag-
nitudes and characteristics at each assembly area, we manually
grouped each of the pour points identiﬁed above with the nearest
assembly area (Fig. 1) based on proximity and ease of movement
along the road network. The evacuation-sheds corresponding to
the pour points assigned to each assembly area were merged to-
gether to produce evacuation basins, providing both a clear visual
indicator of ﬂow neighborhoods and a means of quantifying
counts and types of population likely to reach each assembly area.
Evacuation sheds distant enough from assembly areas that evac-
uees reaching them would likely be isolated are also identiﬁed to
highlight areas that may warrant new assembly areas and to
provide additional information for ﬁrst responders searching for
survivors.
3.4. Physical barriers to evacuation
To estimate potential evacuation impacts from earthquake-re-
lated ground failures, we integrated our evacuation-pathways
outputs with an analysis of earthquake-induced shallow landslides
for the Hoquiam-Aberdeen-Cosmopolis area summarized in
Slaughter et al. [38]. Landslide susceptibility maps in Slaughter
et al. [38] were created by calculating a grid cell's critical accel-
eration (ac), which is the earthquake-induced ground acceleration
at which the slope exceeds static stability and is a function of the
static factor of safety (based on soil characteristics), the expected
acceleration due to gravity, and the angle of the slope [13,14].
Critical-acceleration estimates were modeled using 3-feet eleva-
tion data (resampled to 10-feet) and 1:100,000 geologic maps that
included 1:6000-scale agricultural soil data. We use a landslide-
susceptibility map from Slaughter et al. [38] that can be con-
sidered a worst-case scenario and winter conditions, because it
assumes a fully saturated, 10-foot soil column. We extracted cells
identiﬁed as having high (ac¼0.0–0.2) or medium (ac¼0.2–0.3)
likelihood of landslides from this susceptibility map. Overlaying
this surface on both the evacuation watersheds and the pre-as-
signed evacuation routes [44], we identiﬁed escape routes in
danger of blockage by earthquake-triggered landslides either un-
derneath evacuation routes or on bluffs adjacent to these routes.
Using the ﬂow lines, we quantiﬁed the number of people using
each evacuation route who may be unable to evacuate in the event
of a slide. Whether people will be able to traverse or go around
every slide deposit is unknown and likely is inﬂuenced by the site-
speciﬁc conditions and the mobility of an individual. Therefore,
this analysis is only to highlight potential obstacles and is not a
deﬁnitive statement on evacuation-path integrity. Follow-up work
to gauge perceptions, tolerance, and abilities for moving over
landslide deposits is warranted in certain sections of a community.
This issue also exists for travel around road debris related with
seismically induced liquefaction, another hazard discussed in
Slaughter et al. [38]. We do not explicitly identify evacuation
corridors that could be impacted by liquefaction-related debris
because liquefaction hazard zones are more generalized than site-
speciﬁc landslide hazard zones (e.g., Aberdeen is covered by three
relative-hazard zones) and evacuation delays to move around in-
dividual sand boils that result from liquefaction under roads are
likely on the order of less than a minute. In addition to earth-
quake-induced landslides, we also identiﬁed potential blockages
for ﬂow paths crossing bridges in the study area, since earthquake
ground shaking could make bridges impassable. For this casestudy, we assume all bridges could potentially fail and do not take
into account the structural integrity of any individual bridge.4. Results
4.1. Evacuation potential
Modeling results suggest that the majority of the study area
could be evacuated in less than 20–25 min, assuming at-risk in-
dividuals are moving at a fast walk (1.52 m/s) and remaining on
roads during the evacuation (Fig. 5). Isolated areas of Aberdeen
have clearance times on the order 25–32 min. Of the estimated
20,878 residents and 9876 employees in tsunami-hazard zones
shown in Fig. 5, modeling results suggest that 97.5% of all at-risk
residents and 99.8% of employees may have sufﬁcient time to
evacuate if they evacuate immediately at the start of the CSZ
earthquake (i.e., an assumption of 25 min available for evacuation).
The remaining at-risk population with evacuation travel times
greater than 25 min may still be able to reach safety because
(1) they could be trained to move at a faster speed, and (2) the 25-
min for wave arrival time is based on arrival times on the open-
ocean coast to the west of Aberdeen and it will take additional
time for waves to travel across Grays Harbor Bay.
The percentages of successful evacuations drop to 91.2% and
95.8% for residents and employees, respectively, if at-risk in-
dividuals wait to evacuate until earthquake-related ground shak-
ing ends (i.e., an assumption of 20 min for an evacuation). Al-
though it may be difﬁcult, if not impossible, to initiate an eva-
cuation during the initial ground shaking, an additional 1313 re-
sidents and 327 employees may not reach high ground therefore if
they take initial earthquake safety measures during an earthquake
and wait to evacuate those ﬁve minutes during ground shaking.
The percentages of successful evacuations further drop to 85.2%
and 90.3% for residents and employees, respectively, if individuals
take an additional ﬁve minutes after ground shaking ceases to
initiate an evacuation. This translates to an additional 1473 re-
sidents and 751 employees not reach reaching high ground before
wave arrival. The two population groups should not be added to
estimate the total number of people, since the amount of overlap
between groups is unknown and will vary based on location
within the community and time of day when a tsunami occurs.
Local emergency managers are better suited for making these
assumptions given their local knowledge.
Mapped estimates of travel time shown in Fig. 5 and the
number of residents and employees that may or may not reach
high ground before wave arrival are based on an assumption that
individuals evacuate at a constant base evacuation speed of 1.52
m/s. In reality, travel speeds of evacuees will vary depending on
their ability, the distance they must travel to high ground, and the
landscape conditions along an evacuation route. We therefore
created a series of maps that summarizes the minimum travel
speed that must be maintained for at-risk individuals to reach high
ground before wave arrival (Fig. 6). Three maps of minimum travel
speeds were created to reﬂect three evacuation scenarios:
(a) individuals immediately evacuating as soon as the earthquake
ground shaking begins (i.e., a 25-min evacuation window),
(b) individuals waiting until earthquake ground shaking ceases
before evacuating (i.e., a 20-min evacuation window), and
(c) individuals waiting until earthquake ground shaking ceases
and then taking an additional ﬁve minutes to evacuate (i.e., a 15-
min evacuation window). Based on historical accounts of evacua-
tions in Alaskan coastal communities during the 1964 Good Friday
earthquake and tsunami disaster [5], the most likely scenario is
that individuals will not evacuate immediately but instead wait
until ground shaking ceases (i.e., Fig. 6(b)). This scenario is also
Fig. 5. Map of estimated travel times out of tsunami-hazard zone using only roads and assuming a fast walking speed (1.52 m/s).
Fig. 6. Maps of estimated minimum travel speeds along road networks that pedestrian must maintain to evacuate out of tsunami-hazard zones, based on time windows of
(a) 25 min, (b) 20 min, and (c) 15 min. Sites 1-3 identiﬁed on maps are discussed in the article and denote areas where fast-running speeds are required to evacuate out of
hazard zones before wave arrival.
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reach strategy, which is necessary to protect building occupants
during initial ground shaking and ensure that they survive a pre-
ceding earthquake before attempting to move to high ground.
Fig. 6a–c demonstrate how the majority of individuals in tsu-
nami-prone areas of Hoquiam, Aberdeen, and Cosmopolis may be
able to evacuate to high ground moving at rates ranging from that
of an impaired adult (0.89 m/s) to a fast walk (1.52 m/s). Areas
where individuals will need to maintain running speeds are pri-
marily on an airport runway in west Hoquiam (site 1), near a
lumber processing plant on the southern banks of the Chehalis
River in Aberdeen (site 2), and a rural road east of Cosmopolis (site
3). Overall, Fig. 6a demonstrates that all of the study area can be
evacuated at a fast walk or slower if at-risk individuals im-
mediately evacuate when ground shaking begins, although main-
taining these higher rates during ground shaking may be difﬁcult.
A comparison of minimum travel speeds in Fig. 6a–c demonstrate
how decreases in the amount of time available for an evacuation
from 25 down to 15 min requires more people to achieve and
maintain quicker travel speeds.
The breakdown of population exposure as a function of minimum
travel speed necessary to reach high ground before wave arrival
(Fig. 7) indicates that the majority of residents (76%), employees
(82%), customers at community businesses (82%), individuals at de-
pendent-care facilities (83%), and tourists at public venues (77%) may
be able to reach safety if they maintain at least the speed of an im-
paired adult (0.89 m/s). These percentages assume individuals wait
until ground shaking ends before they initiate an evacuation (i.e.,
20 min are available to evacuate) and increase in the less likely
scenario of people instantly leaving at the onset of the earthquake.
For this scenario, there are approximately 1300 residents, 261 em-
ployees, 18 community businesses, 5 dependent-care facilities, and
2 public venues in areas that would require evacuees to achieve and
maintain a slow running speed of 3.85 m/s.
4.2. Evacuation ﬂowlines and basins
Fig. 8 summarizes the thirteen evacuation basins based on
modeled ﬂowlines, watershed pour points (i.e., grid cells where
ﬂowlines cross into safe areas), and a manual grouping of pour
points with the nearest assembly area. The manual grouping of
pour points was based on their proximity to assembly areas and
ease of movement along the road network. For example, a seg-
ment of highway 109 west of Hoquiam is considered not part of
basin #1 because residents in this area would need to travel a
great distance eastward through the tsunami-hazard zone to reach
assembly area #1, instead of moving approximately 50 m to the0
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Fig. 7. Graphs of the distribution of (a) residents and employees, and (b) various busines
min evacuation window before wave arrival.north behind their homes to safety. In other cases, rivers separate
evacuees from nearby assembly areas, such as residents in the
Woodlawn neighborhood and Upper Hoquiam River of northeast
Hoquiam and assembly areas #2 and #3 (Fig. 8).
When population values are used as weights for the evacuation
ﬂow accumulation, each cell value reports the total count of all
population values ‘upstream.’ For example, by examining the value
of the resident and business pathways on highway 101 crossing
the Chehalis River, we estimate that 114 residents and 87 em-
ployees use the bridge crossing south to north for evacuation to
assembly area #8. This functionality is key to understanding po-
pulation demand at assembly areas, as well as estimating the
number of evacuees that could be cut off from high ground and
assembly areas due to ground failures. Fig. 9 portrays the major
evacuation corridors, based on the population weighted ﬂow ac-
cumulation channels. Cell values in Fig. 9 represent the combined
population of residents and employees for cartographic purposes
(i.e., having separate lines would be difﬁcult to discern); therefore,
this combined value may overestimate the number in a particular
cell because an individual working in the hazard zone may also
live near their place of employment. However, since these esti-
mates do not include customers or tourists, then the potential
over-count is less signiﬁcant than potential undercounts.
Recognizing this caveat of potential over- and under-counts, Fig. 9
indicates the roads that may receive the highest number of evacuees
during a CSZ earthquake and subsequent tsunami. Six roads are ex-
pected to have in excess of 1000 people attempting to reach high
ground. Fig. 9 also portrays evacuation routes that are noted on ofﬁcial
evacuation maps for this area (Washington Department of Natural
Resource, 2007). Our modeled ﬂowlines correspond well with the
established evacuation routes with only a few exceptions. Two ex-
ceptions include the ﬂowlines in north Aberdeen that end with 1587
and 1072 individuals (Fig. 9) but ofﬁcial routes are only one block away
from the optimal ﬂowline, suggesting an insigniﬁcant difference in
evacuation times. Another exception is in south Aberdeen where a
ﬂowline along South Lewis Street ends with 1365 individuals (Fig. 9).
The ofﬁcial evacuation route is to the west along highway 105 (also
known locally as South Boone Street). The two roads are only one
block apart at one point, therefore individuals during an actual eva-
cuationwould have little difﬁculty shifting over to highway 105 if they
have been trained to do so or are directed by public safety ofﬁcials.
4.3. Population demand at assembly areas
Likely population demand at pre-determined assembly areas
varies considerably in our study area. The number of residents
varies from a low of 33 residents and 4 employees at assembly0
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Fig. 8. Map showing evacuation basins and related assembly areas, as well as areas with no nearby assembly areas based on optimal pedestrian evacuation modeling.
Fig. 9. Map of assembly areas, ofﬁcial walking evacuation routes (both from [44]), and modeled weighted evacuation ﬂow accumulation raster values. Values on the map
refer to the highest combined population at the pour point.
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sembly area #3 (Fig. 10a). Although assembly area #3 has both
high resident and employee counts, other assembly areas vary
depending on the population type. For example, assembly areas
#4, #11, and #12 have high estimated residential counts but re-
latively lower employee counts, whereas assembly area #10 has a
high employee count and a relatively lower residential count.
Assembly area #8 has the highest combined number of commu-
nity business (99), dependent-care facilities (19), and public ve-
nues (9) (Fig. 10b). Other assembly areas likely to have high cus-
tomer counts include site #3 (69 community businesses, 32 de-
pendent-care facilities, and 7 public venues) and site #7 (85
community businesses, 19 dependent-care facilities, and 12 public
venues). Local emergency managers, working in collaboration with
business owners, could further improve these estimates by de-
termining which of these businesses or locations (e.g., a park near
a business) are likely to generate higher volumes of evacuees
overall or at a given time during the day, week, or year. This in-
formation could also be used to better understand the amount of
overlap of resident and employee counts for a given assembly area.Using census-block information also provides insight on the
type of residents that may be at various assembly areas. This in-
formation can help guide relief planning, such as stocked caches of
relief supplies at an assembly area. For example, Fig. 10c sum-
marizes the distribution of residents less than 5 years in age and
greater than 65 years in age, which are two demographic groups
that may have additional physical, emotional, or dietetic needs
after a catastrophic event. Demographic data suggest that the re-
sidential evacuee population in our study area contains 1593
children less than 5 years and 2562 individuals older than 65
years. Results suggest that the number of children under 5 years in
age at a given assembly area is fairly consistent when compared to
the total number of residents estimated at the same site. The
number of residents over 65 years in age is not as consistent. For
example, although assembly areas #4–7 and #11–12 have similar
numbers of children less than 5 years in age (a range of 137–171
individuals), the number of older residents varies considerably for
these same assembly areas (141–407 individuals).
Not all at-risk individuals will have easy access to assembly areas
after the earthquake and tsunami. Based on our analysis of
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N. Wood et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 18 (2016) 41–5550evacuation pathways and basins, we estimate that there are ap-
proximately 560 residents, 417 employees, 5 community businesses,
and 3 public venues in areas that do not have an ofﬁcial assembly
area reasonably near them (Fig. 11). At-risk individuals in areas with
no ofﬁcial assembly area may choose to shelter in place at high
ground near their homes or make their way if possible to the nearest
assembly area after tsunami waves have receded. The decision to
move to assembly areas between the arrival of tsunami waves may
be discouraged by emergency managers in pre-event education ef-
forts given the uncertainty of arrival times and heights for an entire
suite of tsunami waves associated with a Cascadia subduction zone
earthquake. Another issue is the likely difﬁculty in sending out “all-
clear” messages due to damaged telecommunication facilities from
the initial earthquake and subsequent tsunami waves. We estimate
that 400 of the 560 residents are in the Woodlawn neighborhood of
northeast Hoquiam (Fig. 8). This is understandable since this area is
considered in tsunami-hazard zones associated with newer in-
undation modeling, but is not considered at risk in the publicly
available, previously published tsunami-evacuation brochure.
Therefore, no assembly areas have been ofﬁcially determined for this
upriver community. We estimate that 397 of the 417 employees with
no clear assembly area are in Junction City, which is east of Aberdeen
and east of the Chehalis River (Fig. 8). There are also public venues in
and near Junction City with no nearby assembly area, as well as
community businesses there and in the Woodlawn community
northeast of Hoquiam (Fig. 11).
4.4. Evacuation obstacles
An overlay of potential earthquake-induced ground failures and
evacuation pathways suggests that most at-risk individuals should
be able to reach assembly areas. Across the study area, no land-
slide-hazard zones directly overlap evacuation routes. We then
turned our attention to identifying landslide-hazard zones for
bluffs adjacent to evacuation routes, which indicate the potential
for debris from a nearby landslide blocking a route. Imagery in-
terpretation suggests main evacuation pathways to assembly areas
#1, #3, #7, #8, and #11–13 do not have landslide hazards on ad-
jacent hillsides (Fig. 12). Landslides are possible along highways
near assembly areas #2 and #9, but routes to the assembly areas
are not expected to be impacted. However, landslide on these
sections of highways could affect post-tsunami response effortsN
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sting assembly areas, including (a) residents and employees, (b) community busi-
Fig. 12. Map of areas where evacuation pathways may be interrupted by landslide debris or bridge failure. Landslide susceptibility data are from Slaughter et al. [38].
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transportation routes to rural areas outside of the three commu-
nities. This is also the case near the Woodlawn neighborhood,
Highway 101 southeast of Cosmopolis, Highway 109 west of Ho-
quiam, and Wishkah Road north of Aberdeen.
Evacuation pathways to assembly areas #4–6 may be compro-
mised because each have medium to high landslide hazards on
bluffs adjacent to their routes (Fig. 12). There is a medium to high
likelihood of landslide hazards surrounding the majority of as-
sembly area #4, including bluffs adjacent to the primary road to it.
There is also landslide potential for the route to assembly area #5,
although the hazard zones are well into the area considered safe;
therefore, individuals would be able to establish an unofﬁcial as-
sembly area before the road segment that may be covered in
landslide debris. Finally, three of the six roads leading to assembly
area #6 have landslide hazards, suggesting that at-risk individuals
may be able to take alternate routes to safety.
Another potential obstacle for an evacuee is a bridge failure
from the initial earthquake. A visual interpretation of imagery and
spatial overlay of evacuation basins and pathways suggest that
some at-risk individuals may be unable to reach assembly areas
#4, #8, and #10, as well as evacuate Junction City east of Aberdeen
if bridges were to fail during the initial earthquake (Fig. 12). The
Hoquiam River Bridge, Chehalis River Bridge, and the Young Street
Bridge into North Aberdeen are all used in the modeling as
shortest distance evacuation paths. The Hoquiam River Bridge is
considered an optimal evacuation route for 228 residents and 101
employees from Hoquiam into East Hoquiam and upward to as-
sembly area #4. If the bridge failed, assembly area #3 would be the
closest site on the west side of the river and clearance times would
be on the order of 20 min (an increase of approximately 8 min
over routes that involve crossing eastward on the Hoquiam River
Bridge). The Chehalis River Bridge is considered an optimal route
for 114 residents and 87 employees on the south side of the river
to assembly area #8. If this bridge failed during the earthquake,
evacuees would be forced to move south to assembly areas #11
and #12; however, clearance times for the area just south of the
bridge would rise from approximately 21 min for the route that
crosses the bridge to 30 min for the southern route. The Young
Street Bridge in northeast Aberdeen is considered the optimal
evacuation route for 91 residents and 1 business to assembly area
#10. If the Young Street Bridge were to fail, individuals on the
south side of the bridge could move west to assembly area #8 and
clearance times to high ground would still be less than 15 min.5. Discussion
Successful evacuations are critical to saving lives from future
tsunamis. Pedestrian-evacuation modeling related to tsunami ha-
zards has primarily focused on identifying areas and the number
of people in these areas where successful evacuations are unlikely
before ﬁrst wave arrival. The purpose of this article is to focus on
modeling that supports risk-reduction planning for at-risk in-
dividuals in areas where successful evacuations are likely, pro-
viding they recognize the need to take self-protective action and
move efﬁciently to high ground. In this section, we discuss the
implications of our results on evacuation and response planning,
mitigation and long-term comprehensive planning, and areas for
further research.
5.1. Implications for evacuation and response planning
The ability to identify likely evacuation pathways, the spatial
distribution of survivors, and impediments along pathways pro-
vides emergency managers with actionable information for out-
reach, evacuation route planning, and post-disaster relief plan-
ning. In addition, it also provides local planners with new in-
formation that could be used when assessing or siting potential
locations of critical facilities or those that may house vulnerable
populations. With regard to evacuation outreach, maps that de-
monstrate evacuation success for most at-risk individuals at var-
ious pedestrian travel speeds (Fig. 6) can be used to increase po-
sitive outcome expectancy in individuals, which is considered a
signiﬁcant factor in motivating people to prepare [30]. Elected
ofﬁcials, the public, and the media often interpret extreme events
(e.g., Cascadia subduction zone earthquake and tsunami) as not
survivable (e.g., [37]) and as such, at-risk individuals may not see a
reason to take preventative steps. Our maps of travel speed tied to
a credible CSZ tsunami scenario indicate that the majority of
people in our study area would have sufﬁcient time to evacuate.
Evacuation travel-speed maps also provide actionable in-
formation to at-risk individuals on how fast they would need to
move based on their evacuation decisions. For example, Fig. 6
demonstrates how minimum travel speeds to evacuate out of
hazard zones vary if individuals evacuate at the onset of the
earthquake, wait ﬁve minutes until the earthquake ground shak-
ing ends, or take an additional ﬁve minutes after the earthquake to
evacuate. Results suggest that the majority of the residents and
employees in our study area (97.5% and 99.8%, respectively) could
N. Wood et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 18 (2016) 41–5552evacuate out of the tsunami-hazard zone before wave arrival if
they immediately started to move to high ground at the beginning
of the earthquake and moved at a reasonable “fast walk” speed of
1.52 m/s. Because it may be difﬁcult to move during the intense
ground shaking [5] and the widespread training to “drop, cover,
and hold” during an earthquake, waiting until ground shaking
ends to evacuate may be more likely and prudent for many in-
dividuals. However, this evacuation decision to wait until ground
shaking ends may result in 1313 residents and 327 employees
potentially not reaching high ground. Such information may pro-
vide additional motivation and impetus to enhance the travel
speed of populations within this area and practice evacuations on
a more routine basis. Additionally, it demonstrates the value of
retroﬁtting structures in tsunami inundation zones, both for
structural and non-structural hazards. If a building and its con-
tents are secured, it will enable occupants to evacuate more
quickly. These numbers increase by 1473 residents and 751 em-
ployees if people take an additional ﬁve minutes to evacuate.
Emergency managers can use these results and maps in evacua-
tion education and training efforts to discuss with some at-risk
individuals the beneﬁts of improved mitigation measures to exit
buildings more quickly after the earthquake shaking subsides. This
may motivate faster speeds than expected given the potential
evacuation delays.
Understanding evacuee demographics relative to minimum
travel speeds can also help emergency managers determine the
likelihood of successful evacuations, combat potential fatalism
through improved public education, and reinforce the positive
outcomes that can be achieved by practicing tsunami evacuations.
Results suggest that the majority of residents, employees, tourists
at public venues, customers at community businesses, school-
children, and patients at dependent care facilities in our study area
can reach safety moving at the relatively slow speed (0.89 m/s) of
an impaired adult (Fig. 7). However, there are some at-risk in-
dividuals in areas where minimum travel speeds are higher, which
may not be feasible for individuals with mobility issues. Depend-
ing on the amount of available time for an evacuation, the number
of residents over 65 years in age in areas where they would need
to maintain a fast running speed (i.e., 3.85 m/s) ranges from 20
residents (no delay for a 25-min evacuation window) to 266 re-
sidents (waiting for ground shaking to end plus an additional ﬁve-
minute delay for a 15-min evacuation window). The number of
younger residents (i.e., less than ﬁve years in age) that would also
have difﬁculty maintaining the fast running speed ranges from 22
to 203, given the same evacuation delay scenarios. Comparing
travel time maps with local demographics help emergency man-
agers and state agencies responsible for permitting the use of
adult family homes to better understand where evacuations may
be successful for some but not all at-risk individuals, where to
target evacuation training, and where to develop vertical-evacua-
tion refuges or consider alternative locations for adult family
homes.
In addition to framing evacuation education and training, re-
sults can help emergency managers evaluate the utility and
availability of predetermined evacuation corridors. Many, but not
all, of the predetermined evacuation corridors in our study area
align with our modeled results of optimal paths to safety. Next
steps could include re-examining the predetermined routes and
determining if and where changes may be warranted. For example,
revisions may not be warranted based on our modeling because
earlier discussions within the community may have incorporated
route preferences of evacuees that were not incorporated into our
analysis. Another use of modeling results is in determining im-
pediments along evacuation routes, such as heavy brush or vege-
tation, fences or hedge lines, water obstacles, narrow paths that
limit evacuations, as well as potential impediments related tobridge failure or landslide-debris blockages. With regard to the
potential impacts of bridge failures on evacuation potential, al-
ternative routes are possible for all evacuation pathways over the
three primary bridges (Hoquiam River Bridge, Chehalis River
Bridge, and the Young Street Bridge), although evacuation clear-
ance times would increase if bridges were to fail. The increase in
clearance time for seeking alternative routes is most pronounced
for the estimated 200 evacuees traveling over the Chehalis River
Bridge; however, the difference is from 21 to 30 min, which is
relatively close to the wave arrival and likely could be accounted
for by an increase in travel speed by evacuees. Such information
may beneﬁt transportation planners, city, county engineers, and
others when prioritizing potential bridge retroﬁtting or replace-
ment options.
Knowing the approximate number and demographics of evac-
uees along certain evacuation corridors helps emergency man-
agers with developing effective assembly areas, both in their
ability to accommodate the magnitude and type of evacuees. For
example, the estimated magnitude of evacuees at predetermined
assembly areas varies considerably from 33 residents at assembly
area #9 to 3699 residents at assembly area #3. Follow-up discus-
sions may involve determining whether each assembly area could
handle the estimated magnitude and what, if anything, could be
done to better balance the number of evacuees among neighbor-
ing assembly areas. It will also enable communities to work more
effectively amongst themselves and in conjunction with emer-
gency managers to receive and manage evacuees until larger-scale
response operations can be mobilized. Research presented here
also supports the coordination of public health ofﬁcials and
emergency managers to adequately staff personnel and stage re-
sources at assembly areas to match likely evacuee demographics.
For example, an assembly area that is expected to handle a high
number of older evacuees (e.g., site #3, Fig. 10c) may require
greater medical supplies to deal with pre-existing health issues or
with injuries sustained during an evacuation, be able to accom-
modate greater dietary restrictions with regard to relief supplies,
and be identiﬁed for pre-scripted emergency supply packages that
will be deployed immediately following a catastrophic local
earthquake. Results can also determine gaps in assembly areas,
either because certain areas of the community are not realistically
served by a nearby assembly area (Fig. 11) or because routes to
assembly areas may be compromised by post-earthquake ground
failures (Fig. 12).
5.2. Implications for mitigation planning
In addition to supporting evacuation and response planning,
methods described here also provide support for efforts to miti-
gate current development and to guide future land use planning.
Identifying the major pathways and the impediments along these
pathways can be used to understand if and where structural and
non-structural mitigation alternatives could be implemented to
increase the likelihood of successful evacuations. Community-
based mitigation scenarios could be modeled based on structure
type and existing occupancy classiﬁcation to visualize and quantify
changes in minimum pedestrian travel speeds, the number of
people that can successfully evacuate, and assembly area capacity.
Site-speciﬁc mitigation strategies along major evacuation corri-
dors could include landscape maintenance to ensure undeveloped
ﬁelds are clear and available for use (e.g., removing seasonal ve-
getation), improved lighting to support nighttime evacuations,
rerouting bike or walking paths to align with major evacuation
corridors, paving existing pedestrian trails, or building steps in
steep areas. Mitigation strategies may be demographic dependent;
for example, elderly populations may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to climb
steps and therefore a sloped paved path might be preferable in
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struction of pedestrian bridges over water obstacles, the creation
of new trails or roads outside of the hazard zone to connect
evacuees with assembly areas, or enhancing the road network
within the hazard zone (e.g., road widening to ease congestion
potential or extending dead-end roads out of the hazard zone). In
addition, infrastructure maintenance and seismic upgrades to
roads and bridges could be prioritized based on their ability to
reduce evacuation clearance times.
Infrastructure strengthening or rerouting is especially critical in
areas where post-earthquake ground failures could impede eva-
cuations. In our study area, landslide potential could obstruct ac-
cess to assembly area #4, cause evacuees to reroute to get to as-
sembly areas #5 and #6, and disrupt the ability of response per-
sonnel to reach evacuees at assembly areas #2 and #9 due to road
blockages (Fig. 12). Bridge failures could block evacuations to as-
sembly areas #4, #8, and #10, as well as those evacuating from
Junction City. Understanding where landslides and other post-
earthquake ground failures may impact evacuation pathways can
assist emergency managers in determining if and where to prior-
itize structural improvements to the roadways.
In addition to identifying short-term mitigation strategies,
evacuation-modeling results could be used for guiding long-range
comprehensive land use planning. Plans for new residential or
commercial development could be evaluated, either qualitatively
with existing evacuation maps or quantitatively with new scenario
modeling, in terms of the volume of new evacuees using existing
evacuation corridors, the demographic mix at assembly areas, the
volume of people that may have insufﬁcient time to evacuate, and
the range of options to improve evacuations. In situations where
new development creates signiﬁcant evacuation issues, conditions
for development approval could include vertical-evacuation re-
fuges if natural high ground is not accessible or evacuation ease-
ments using privately owned lands to ensure direct routes to
safety during a tsunami. For example, the Revised Code of Wa-
shington Chapter 38.52, Section 180 permits the State of Wa-
shington to indemnify and hold harmless persons, partnerships,
corporations, or political subdivisions that evacuate onto private
land when it has been ofﬁcially designated as a shelter. Such
agreements have been successfully executed in the past between
the State of Washington and private timber companies.
The potential use of evacuation modeling as a land-use plan-
ning tool is similar to Allan et al.'s [1] discussion of the inﬂuence of
urban morphology (e.g., modularity and connectivity) on a city's
capacity to respond quickly to extreme events, as well as its long-
term resilience. For example, Allan et al. [1] assert that tsunami
evacuations were hampered in Concepcion, Chile following the
2010 earthquake and tsunami due to dense urban centers, a small
number of narrow, winding roads, and pedestrian congestion at
the junctions between the low-lying plains and the hills with safer
higher ground. Leon and March [19] take this concept further by
implementing evacuation modeling in the Chilean city of Talca-
huano (also severely affected by the 2010 earthquake and tsunami)
to gauge the impact of changes in urban design on improving
tsunami-evacuation clearance times. Their results clearly demon-
strate how mitigation efforts that increase network connectivity,
such as road extensions or new access roads, can improve the
community's evacuation potential (or “rapid resilience” as termed
by the authors). Leon and March [20] addresses similar issues of
changes in urban design to improve tsunami evacuations, but fo-
cus on modeling pedestrian evacuations in light of the interplay of
macroscale aspects of urban conﬁguration (e.g., road networks)
and micro-scale aspects of the built environment (e.g., street
lighting and signage).5.3. Areas for future research
Building on methods presented here, research in several areas
would further the understanding of evacuation procedures, re-
sponse challenges, and relief planning for local tsunami threats.
Although not an exhaustive list, we discuss four areas for con-
tinued research – mixed LCD and network analysis, congestion
analysis, preferred wayﬁnding of evacuees, and evacuation beha-
vior of at-risk individuals. A mixed evacuation model that le-
verages LCD and network-based analytical approaches may pro-
vide gains in geospatial data processing time and ﬂexibility in
analysis. For example, LCD-based approaches could model move-
ment in less constrained areas (e.g., rural areas with large, open
lots) but could be explicitly linked to network-based approaches in
more constrained areas (e.g., dense urban environments).
A natural next step to population-based, ﬂowline analysis is in
identifying choke points along evacuation corridors. Priest et al.
[36] discuss evacuation choke points for bridges within a hazard
zone that are cut off because tsunami waves may travel faster up
creeks and rivers than overland ﬂow from the ocean. Choke point
analysis that builds on our population-based ﬂowlines could focus
instead on congestion hotspots due to the convergence of high
population-magnitude ﬂow lines. Although this congestion ana-
lysis could be based on a common travel-speed assumption (as
was done in this analysis), one would ideally take into account
varying travel speed assumptions for the different type of people
that may be attempting to use similar evacuation corridors. Re-
cognizing the range of travel speeds for people converging to-
wards common pathways would provide the most realistic esti-
mate of congestion potential.
A third area of future research is improving our understanding
of preferred evacuation routes and wayﬁnding of at-risk in-
dividuals. Evacuation-modeling results presented here are con-
sidered optimal routes; however, individuals may take alternate
routes for various reasons, such as habits engrained by daily rou-
tines. A logical next step is to compare optimal routes based on
modeling with preferred routes by geospatially tracking volun-
teers in a local evacuation exercise. Such data would provide in-
sight on evacuation preferences and best case versus likely case in
terms of potential congestion points and the distribution of sur-
vivors at assembly areas.
Another area of research that can build off results presented
here is the behavioral and sociological aspects of an evacuation.
Our current work makes the geographic case that evacuations are
possible for many individuals due to proximity to high ground;
however, it does not address the range of people’s perceptions and
behaviors that would inﬂuence their decision-making process for
evacuating and taking appropriate self-protective actions. There is
currently a lack of sociological or psychological literature on eva-
cuation behavior during tsunamis, particularly in the United States
[22,27]; however, insights could be gained from the literature on
evacuation decision-making for other sudden-onset hazards
[6,18,23]. For example, there is evidence that individuals make
evacuation decisions in the context of perceptions and conditions
of other members of a household [7,31]. The Protection Action
Decision Model (PADM) is a theoretical behavior framework that
suggests decisions are made based on variables such as environ-
mental and social cues, receiver characteristics, and information
sources [21], and it has been used to explain evacuation behavior
in American Samoa during the 2009 Samoa Islands tsunami [2].
Areas for future research to better understand evacuation behavior
from future Cascadia-related tsunamis could include whether
people perceive the need to evacuate given the environmental cue
of earthquake ground shaking, what additional social cues would
result in quicker individual decision making, and the inﬂuence of
household characteristics (e.g., caregiver status for children or
N. Wood et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 18 (2016) 41–5554pets) on evacuation decision making. The intention is to build on
our understanding of the landscape of possible evacuations with
insights on the likelihood that at-risk individuals take the
proper self-protective actions to reach high ground.6. Conclusions
The objective of this paper is to demonstrate the development
and use of geospatial, path distance modeling approaches to es-
timate tsunami-evacuation pathways, basins, population demand
at assembly areas, and potential obstacles to safety. Based on our
analysis, we reach several conclusions that bear on future tsunami
risk-reduction research and application to at-risk communities.
 Maps visualizing minimum travel speeds to evacuate hazard
zones provide actionable information on where and how fast
individuals may need to move. This information may raise po-
sitive outcome expectancy for motivating people to prepare.
 Maps of minimum travel speeds to safety that are based on
varying amounts of available evacuation time demonstrate how
required speeds change due to individual evacuation decisions.
 Modeled evacuation pathways and basins linked with popula-
tion data provide emergency managers with the ability to de-
termine the magnitude and demographics of evacuees along
evacuation corridors and at predetermined assembly areas,
which can be used to develop realistic response and relief.
 Results suggest a wide range in the magnitude and type of
evacuees at predetermined assembly areas, as well as identify-
ing other parts of the three communities not realistically served
by an assembly area.
 Earthquake-induced ground failures could obstruct access to
some assembly areas, cause evacuees to reroute to get to other
assembly areas, and isolate some evacuees from relief
personnel.
 Evacuation modeling can be used to identify opportunities for
outreach, response planning and mitigation strategies to en-
hance the likelihood of successful evacuations.Acknowledgments
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